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“The Internet is a prime example of how terrorists can behave in a truly 
transnational way; in response, States need to think and function in an equally 
transnational manner.” 
Ban Ki-moon 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
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Cyber-attacks present significant challenges to a modern, globalised world. Progressively 
used by criminal and terrorist organisations to attack or victimise non-state actors, 
governments are increasingly forced to pursue cyber-security strategies to ensure the security 
of their citizens and private sectors. An examination of New Zealand’s response to the threat 
of cyber-attacks shows that successive governments have taken steps to enhance New 
Zealand’s domestic cyber-security capacity and international cyber-security partnerships. 
These steps have been highly contentious where they have resulted in greater domestic 
surveillance capabilities.  Despite this, New Zealand has enacted significant oversight 
mechanisms that provide reassurance that the New Zealand Government is mindful of the 
delicate steps it must take to maintain an appropriate balance between privacy and security. 
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Section One: Small State Responses to Cyber Threats  
1. Introduction 
The increasing globalisation of the world has intensified the debate concerning the balance 
between privacy and security. This has been especially true following the unauthorised 
release of highly classified intelligence by United States (US) intelligence contractor Edward 
Snowden. Snowden, reportedly inspired by the actions of fellow ‘whistle-blower’ Bradley 
(Chelsea) Manning1, revealed a massive programme of US National Security Agency (NSA) 
surveillance on US and foreign citizens. Exploiting data collected from electronic databases, 
the Internet and cellular companies, the US was conducting what has been called an 
“indiscriminate and arbitrary invasion [of privacy] through the systematic and high-tech 
collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single [US] citizen for purposes of 
querying it and analysing it without judicial approval.”2 These events have occurred at a time 
when the world is experiencing the unprecedented growth of personal data in government 
and online databases, which is in itself transforming the characterisation of private and 
public information. This has reignited a debate calling into question the extent of 
government access to private information and the transparency by which governments 
acquire and analyse this information.  
At the centre of this debate is the human right to privacy upon which modern societies are 
built. Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to protect information about themselves 
and to have some ability to control the release or use of this information. The concept and 
boundaries of privacy are readily changing, driven by the rapid growth of ‘big data’ – data 
widely available online through such mediums as social media, eGovernment and data 
mining sites. Sophisticated algorithms allow complex analysis of this data to determine the 
habits, preferences and networks of billions of individuals, the results of which can be used 
by government and commercial organisations for national security and commercial priorities. 
                                                             
1 The Guardian (10 June 2013) Greenwald, Glenn, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras. “Edward Snowden: The 
Whistleblower behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations.” The Guardian, 10 June 2013. Accessed January 12, 
2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. 
2 New York Daily News (2013) McCarthy Tom, “This overreach is unacceptable': the case against NSA bulk 
collection.” The Guardian, 23 January 2014. Accessed January 12, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/nsa-bulk-collection-chorus-surveillance-under-patriot-act 
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This thesis will be in two sections. Section One will examine the challenges posed to the 
security of state and non-state actors by the rise of cyberspace.  Drawing on the extensive 
cyberspace literature available, it will be demonstrated that the nature of cyberspace has 
shifted the burden of security from the state to the individual.  As one of the foremost goals 
of any state is to protect its citizens, this thesis will then explore the security responses 
available that seek to enhance the security of the state and its citizens while protecting the 
inherent rights of a modern democratic state. By doing so, this thesis will satisfy the question 
of why intelligence collection is important to modern states. Section Two will examine the 
expansion of state powers of surveillance over New Zealanders, and explore how this has 
affected New Zealand’s balance between privacy and security. The thesis will focus 
specifically on the period following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 
2001 as a point when the importance of the balance between privacy and security has been 
reemphasised for the modern age. This thesis will also examine New Zealand’s tolerance as a 
society for increased surveillance powers by the state and address the question: “Why is 
security important in New Zealand and what is being done to maintain an appropriate 
balance between privacy and security?” 
New Zealand makes an interesting case study in understanding the impact that technology 
and globalisation has on the balance between national security of states and individual 
privacy. An increasingly globalised and Internet-connected world brings New Zealand many 
advantages and opportunities. In parallel, globalisation also reduces the advantage of New 
Zealand’s physical isolation, thereby intensifying the threat to New Zealand from state and 
non-state actors. The rise of the Internet has presented new challenges in countering 
espionage and transnational crime, which allow state and non-state actors to remotely 
exploit vulnerabilities in New Zealand’s information and communications systems.  
Internationally there has been a growing escalation of cyber activities,3 and New Zealand 
remains equally at risk of falling victim to these activities as any other globally connected 
state. New Zealand has pursued security strategies and enacted legislation that seek to 
protect its citizens and interests from harm.  
                                                             
3 Ministry for Communications and Information Technology. “New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy: June 
2011”. (Wellington: Ministry for Communications and Information Technology, 7 June 2011), p 1 
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2. Cyber-Security and Mass Surveillance 
Former NSA contractor Edward Snowden will go down in history as one of America's most 
significant whistle-blowers. In 2013, Snowden disclosed a sizeable number of classified NSA 
documents, revealing the details and targets of a covert mass surveillance operation 
conducted by the NSA against US citizens. While working as an employee and contractor to 
US intelligence agencies, Snowden became bitterly disillusioned by what he saw as the 
surveillance state gaining in both breadth and power; “*I+ watched as Obama advanced the 
very policies that I thought would be reined in.”4 Snowden subsequently released a treasure 
trove of highly classified documents to media outlets, including British national newspaper 
The Guardian. Snowden’s stated motivation for stealing approximately 1.7 million 
documents from the NSA was his desire to reveal the actions of a state he believed had 
eroded privacy too far in preference of security. He recounts his primary motivation was “to 
inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done against 
them."5 After releasing the documents Snowden flew to Russia, where he was granted a one-
year temporary asylum by the Russian Government. While the consequences of Snowden’s 
actions are only just now becoming known, they have already reverberated in almost every 
part of the political globe.  
The documents leaked by Snowden and reported by The Guardian newspaper reveal that the 
US Government was collecting the telephone records of tens of millions of American citizens. 
This included accessing data held by US telecommunications companies and Internet firms, 
including Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo, which was used to track online 
communications through a clandestine mass electronic surveillance data mining programme 
known as PRISM.6 Snowden’s leaks exposed a similar scale of surveillance on citizens of the 
United Kingdom (UK) by the NSA’s British counterpart, the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ). Reports in The Guardian newspaper claim to reveal that the GCHQ 
had secretly gained access to the fibre-optic cables that carry most of the world’s phone calls 
                                                             
4 Sean Wilentz, “Would You Feel Differently About Snowden, Greenwald, and Assange If You Knew What They 
Really Thought?” The New Republic, 19 January 2014. Accessed 29 January 
2014.www.newrepublic.com/article/116253/edward-snowden-glenn-greenwald-julian-assange-what-they-
believe,  
5 Greenwald, Glen et al, (10 June 2013) 
6 Ewen MacAskill et al, “GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications” 
theguardian.com: The Guardian, 21 June 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-
secret-world-communications-nsa, accessed 14 January 2014. 
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and Internet traffic, and had begun to process vast streams of sensitive personal 
information.7 This information was reportedly shared with the NSA, enabling the intelligence 
agencies to access and process vast quantities of communications of entirely innocent 
people as well as targeted suspects.8 Known as Tempora, the GCHQ programme represented 
“a window on to their everyday lives, sucking up every form of communication from the 
fibre-optic cables that ring the world.”9  
Snowden’s actions have seen him variously described as a hero10 or a traitor.11 "I don't see 
myself as a hero," he has said, "because what I'm doing is self-interested: I don't want to live 
in a world where there's no privacy and therefore no room for intellectual exploration and 
creativity."12 Whatever the motivations for Snowden’s actions, they have prompted an 
international debate regarding government mass surveillance and the balance between 
national security and privacy. The passionate debate that has exploded throughout the 
global intelligence communities, governments and civil liberties groups cannot be 
overstated. Rick Ledgett, the NSA official in charge of the task force investigating the 
Snowden leaks, has said that Snowden has 31,000 documents that Ledgett described as “the 
keys to the kingdom”.13 Commentators have speculated that the damage done to the US 
intelligence setup could be comparable to that of "9/11" to national security.14  
3. Why Does Cyber Matter? 
Since the late 1980s, the Internet has grown in terms of accessibility and importance, and 
has proven to be a highly dynamic means of communication. It has been both a driving factor 
and key characteristic of globalisation, and has granted states, corporations and individuals a 
truly global reach by allowing quick and effective communication across borders to an almost 
                                                             
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Charles Moore, “Edward Snowden is a traitor, just as surely as George Blake was”. Telegraph.co.uk: The 
Telegraph, 05 July 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10162351/Edward-
Snowden-is-a-traitor-just-as-surely-as-George-Blake-was.html, accessed 14 January 2014 
12 Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “Edward Snowden's Motivation: Internet Freedom”, Mashable.com, 11 June 
2013, http://mashable.com/2013/06/10/edward-snowden-Internet-freedom//, accessed 14 January 2014 
13 The Washington Post, December 2013 
14 Chen Xiangyang, Strategic Impacts of the ‘Snowden Incident’ on International Relations. China-US Focus, 
September 9, 2013. Accessed February 13, 2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/strategic-
impacts-of-the-snowden-incident-on-international-relations/, accessed 14 January 2014 
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limitless audience. The benefits of cyber technology are numerous, starting with its unique 
suitability for sharing information and ideas, which is recognized as a fundamental human 
right.15 Additionally, a high proportion of a modern states’ national infrastructure today 
relies on information technology systems and access to cyberspace to operate. This 
infrastructure can include telecommunications networks, hospitals, financial and security 
services, energy production and distribution, among many others. Furthermore, this critical 
national infrastructure is linked to global information technology systems, described by 
Libicki as approaching “spaghetti status” in terms of their interconnections and 
dependencies, with the advent of cloud computing only increasing this complexity.16  
The world’s reliance on cyberspace and the interconnectedness of government, military and 
civilian sectors has resulted in calls for states to be increasingly concerned about the possible 
impact of a cyber-attack and its threat to national security.17 A 1998 US Commission report 
on National Security in the 21st Century,18 dedicated to understanding how the world will 
likely evolve over the next 25 years, concluded that rapid advances in information and 
biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities for US security, and the national security of all 
advanced states will increasingly be affected by the vulnerabilities of the evolving global 
economic infrastructure.19 A 2014 World Economic Forum report on global risks ranked 
cyber-attacks as the 5th most likely global risk to occur, ahead of terrorism and interstate 
conflict.20 The same report ranked the breakdown of critical information infrastructure as the 
fifth highest risk in terms of global impact.21 Richard Clarke and Christopher Hughes argue 
that large-scale strategic attacks through cyberspace against “critical infrastructure” pose a 
grave threat to national security.22 Such attacks might be attractive to an adversary because 
                                                             
15 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1910 December 1948, 217 A (III), 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/, [accessed 27 December 2013] 
16 Martin Libicki. Pulling Punches in Cyberspace. In Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: 
Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, edited by the National Research Council of the 
National Academies, 123-148. (Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2010). 
17 Natasha Solce ‘The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch – The Cyber Force’ 18 (Alb L 
J Sci & Tech, 2008), p 297 
18 US Commission on National Security/ in the 21st Century. “New World Coming: American Security in the 21st 
Century (Phase I: July 1998) – August 1999).” Accessed January 18, 2014. http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/. 
19 U.SIbid 
20 The 2012 Global Risks Report ranked cyber-attacks as 4th global risk in terms of likelihood. See World 
Economic Forum (2014), p 17 
21 Ibid, p 17 
22 Robert Reardon, and Nazli Choucri. The Role of Cyberspace in International Relations: A View of the 
Literature. (San Diego: MIT, 2012), p 22 
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they can be cheap and difficult to trace, with the anonymity of cyberspace often making it 
difficult or impossible to attribute an attack to a particular attacker with confidence.23  
4. Definitions 
Cyberspace  
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to first define and examine the term ‘cyberspace’. 
There are many different definitions of cyber space and a globally accepted definition has 
not yet been found. Richard Clarke describes cyberspace as a new “domain” of conflict, a 
battle space in which both states and non-state actors can launch strategic “cyber-attacks” 
against adversaries.24 The Oxford English Dictionary simply defines cyberspace as “*t+he 
notional environment within which electronic communication occurs.”25 An accurate 
description should also note that cyberspace spans the globe, using the physical 
infrastructure residing within the other linear domains, and that, as users pass information 
from one site to another, data crosses geographic boundaries by means of the cyberspace 
domain.26 For the purposes of this paper, we will use the comprehensive definition followed 
by the US Department of Defence – cyberspace is “a global domain within the information 
environment, consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications, networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers.”27 
Cyber-attack 
We are also confronted with issues of definition when considering the term ‘cyber-attack’. A 
cyber-attack can cause computer systems and networks to be unavailable or untrustworthy 
and therefore less useful to the adversary, potentially having indirect effects on entities 
                                                             
23 Ibid, p 22 
24 Ibid p 21  
25 Graham Evans, and Jeffrey Newnham. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. (Auckland: Penguin 
Group Limited, 1998). 
26 Michael A. Sinks, Cyber Warfare and International Law, (Research Report Air Command and Staff College Air 
University 2008), p 7 
27 National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23). 
Washington DC: White House, 2008. 
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coupled to or reliant on them.28 The US military has yet to offer an official definition of 
cyber-attack or cyber-warfare, although a 2009 report by the National Research Council of 
the US National Academies offered the following definition: “Cyber-attack refers to 
deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or 
networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or 
networks.”29 This refers to deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy 
computer systems or networks or the information and/or programmes resident in or 
transiting these systems or networks.”30 It should also be noted that cyber-attacks can 
happen over time rather than instantly, and can be conducted remotely. For this paper we 
will adopt the definition of cyber-attack from the US National Research Council: “the 
deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or 
networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or 
networks.”31 An example of a cyber-attack was seen in Israel in January 2012, involving the 
targeting of multiple symbolic Israeli websites, such as the websites of the Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange and the national airline, and the unauthorized disclosure of the credit card and 
account details of thousands of Israeli nationals.32 
5. Cyber-Attack Categories  
Cyber-crime  
There are essentially four types of cyber-attacks. The first is a cyber-crime, being a crime 
committed through the use of information technology that is typically of concern to law 
enforcement. These may be perpetrated by organised criminal organisations, or may be 
individual hackers motivated by the challenge of circumventing security measures or to gain 
notoriety.33 Cyber criminals may also engage in attacks and intrusions for financial gain.34 
The Fourth Annual ‘Cost of Cyber Crime Study: Global’ indicates that both the cost and 
                                                             
28 Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force. (Journal of National Security Law & Policy 4, 
2010): 63-86, p 1 
29 Owens, William A., Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, ed. Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding 
U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities. Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2009. 
30 Ibid, p 1 
31 Ibid 
32 UNODC, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. (New York: United Nations, 2012), p 12 
33 Nicholas C. Rueter, The Cybersecurity Dilemma. Masters thesis, Duke University, 2011, p 8 
34 Ibid, p 8 
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frequency of cybercrime have continued to rise for the fourth straight year, and the 
occurrence of cyber-attacks has more than doubled during this period, while the financial 
impact has increased by nearly 78 percent.35 
Cyber espionage 
A second category is cyber espionage, which includes political and military espionage.36 At a 
state level this is often considered an expansion of traditional efforts to collect information 
on an opponent’s intentions and military capabilities.37 Alternatively, cyber espionage may 
obtain useful economic information by penetrating the computer systems of a competing 
nation’s major industrial firms, such as banks. Some of the most advanced and persistent 
cyber-attacks on governments and critical infrastructure worldwide are thought to originate 
from foreign military and intelligence services or organised criminal groups.38 Media 
organisations around the world are reporting attacks on government systems, national 
infrastructure and businesses that have resulted in the loss of commercially sensitive 
information, intellectual property, and state or trade secrets.39 It was written in 1988 that 
“espionage over networks can be cost-efficient, offer nearly immediate results, and target 
specific locations… insulated from risks of internationally embarrassing incidents.”40 
Warnings about a ‘cyber Pearl Harbour’ extend back to 1991.41 However, although online 
espionage and crime remain daily issues, cyberspace has so far been resilient to truly 
disruptive infrastructure attacks, those that could break systems or societies and not just 
pilfer information.42 While cyber espionage may be utilised during warfare, and may at times 
                                                             
35 “2013 Fourth Annual Cost of Cyber Crime Study: Global” (Ponemon Institute, 2013), Accessed  February 18 
2014, http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/register/2013-fourth-annual-cost-of-cyber-crime-study-global 
36 James Lewis, A Note on the Laws of War in Cyberspace. Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2010, p 2 
37 Ibid, p 2 
38 New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy: June 2011, p 5 
39 New Zealand’s Cyber Security Strategy: June 2011, p 5 
40 Clifford Stoll, “Stalking the Wily Hacker.” Communications of the ACM 31, no. 5 (1988): 484-497. 
http://faculty.cs.tamu.edu/pooch/course/CPSC665/Spring2001/Lessons/Intrusion_Detection_and_Response/p
484-stoll.pdf. 
41 The term “electronic Pearl Harbour” dates to a 1991 testimony by author Winn Schwartau to the US 
Congress. For a longer discussion of this dynamic, see Healey and Grindal 2013 
42 World Economic Forum, p 38 
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even be considered a subset of cyber-warfare, it should not be considered warfare in and of 
itself.43 
Cyber terrorism 
The third category is cyber terrorism. The Internet is often used to promote and support acts 
of terrorism and, while the methods of cyber terrorists may be similar to those of cyber 
criminals, they differ in that cyber terrorism shares an ideological drive equivalent to other 
forms of terrorism.44 A 2012 United Nations (UN) report on the use of the Internet for 
terrorist purposes identified the following categories of use: propaganda (including 
recruitment, radicalization and incitement to terrorism); financing; training; planning 
(including through secret communication and open-source information); execution; and 
cyber-attacks.45 Evan Kohlmann goes so far as to argue that the threat from cyber terrorists 
is greater than the risk of an attack against critical infrastructure,46 although Nye argues that 
cyber terrorism – narrowly defined as using virtual tools to wreak destruction - has thus far 
been rare.47 
Cyber-warfare  
The fourth category is cyber-warfare. Cyber-war is a conflict consisting of cyber-attacks 
between two state actors that relies exclusively or mostly on operations in cyberspace.48 
Modern states are investing heavily in cyber capabilities and are preparing for, and have 
already engaged in, cyber-warfare.49 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is reportedly 
“aggressively developing” its cyber capabilities,50 including the development of cyber-
warfare elements in its army and a volunteer force, and is reportedly pursuing a battalion-
sized force of computer experts to carry out cyber-attacks as a means of seeking 
                                                             
43 Lewis, pp 1-2 
44 Rueter, p 10 
45 UNODC (2012), pp 3-12 
46 Reardon and Choueri, p 23 
47 Nye Jr., Cyber Power. (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 
School, 2010), p 15 
48 Libicki (2010), p 123 
49 Richard A Clarke, and Robert Knake. Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about 
It. (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), pp 30-31 
50 Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union, Cyber Security and Politically, Socially and 
Religiously Motivated Cyber Attacks, p 15 
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asymmetrical advantages over an adversary.51 The 2008 Russo-Georgian War demonstrated 
Russia’s cyber-attack capabilities. Prior to the Russian invasion of the South Ossetia region, 
Georgian Government websites were hit with a series of Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) 
attacks similar to those seen in Estonia in 2007. Although Russian authorities denied 
government involvement in the attacks, security experts linked the attacks to the Russian 
intelligence community.52 Acts of cyber-warfare have been attributed to North Korea, Israel, 
and the United States,53 demonstrating the prevalent use of cyber-attacks as a tool of 
asymmetric warfare. While the international community remains unsettled on whether 
cyber techniques are legally considered weapons and whether cyber-attacks can be 
considered legitimate acts of armed conflict, the denial of service attacks against Estonia in 
200754 and Georgia in 200855 illustrate that this new form of warfare is operational.56 
6. Characteristics of Cyberspace 
Lawlessness of the Internet 
The characteristics of cyberspace present great opportunities and significant challenges for 
states and individuals alike. A 2008 New Zealand Law Commission study stated:  
“The Internet has a number of notable characteristics that make it difficult to 
control, or to trace the flow of data within it. It has no borders – it is not 
physically located in any one state and can be accessed from anywhere. It is 
not centrally owned or controlled. It is interactive and dynamic.”57  
                                                             
51 Daria Brankin, “Could a Cyber Attack Constitute a Crime of Aggression under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court?”, (University of Turin, 2011), p 9 
52 Clarke and& Knake, pp 17-20 
53 Rueter, p 18 
54 In early 2007, Estonia experienced distributed DDoS attacks after relocating a Soviet memorial. Estonian 
authorities eventually prosecuted a lone hacker, although, Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves claimed 
the DDoS attacks could only have been orchestrated by a State actor. 
55 In late 2008, Georgia suffered several weeks of DDoS and defacement attacks against government and 
commercial websites in conjunction with the breakout of armed conflict between Georgia and Russia over the 
disputed Georgian region of South Ossetia. 
56 Brankin, p 17 
57 New Zealand Law Commission. “Privacy: Concepts and Issues. Review of the Law of Privacy: Stage 1”. 
Wellington: Law Commission, 2008, p 18 
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Variously described as ‘the wild west’ and ‘the world’s largest ungoverned space’,58 
cyberspace poses significant challenges to sovereignty in a globalised world. The Internet, 
much like the tribal areas of Pakistan or the tri-border region in South America, is not under 
the control of anyone and is therefore a place to which the lawless will gravitate.59 For all 
intents and purposes, most actors within the cyber domain operate under conditions of 
anarchy, with relatively few enforceable laws and no central authority to regulate behaviour. 
Characteristic of a pre-Hobbesian ungoverned space, the Internet is fraught with difficulties 
and complexities. It can easily be used to facilitate the free flow of communication between 
individuals and the creation of legitimate e-commerce, but can equally be used by criminals 
to conduct criminal activities across geographical borders.  
Yet the Internet is not completely without laws. Established international laws and norms 
govern activities that occur within cyberspace, outlawing many malevolent cyber-operations 
and allowing states to mount robust responses.60 International agreements, such as the 
Convention on Cybercrime,61 are helping to increase the effectiveness of criminal law in 
dealing with cyber-attacks.62 Already states have a recognised sovereign right to exercise 
control over cyber-infrastructure and activities on their territory, as well as to protect them 
from harmful actions.63 International law also obligates states to ensure that cyber-
infrastructure on their territory is not used for acts that unlawfully affect other states.64 
Thus, state responsibilities extend into cyberspace, including the responsibility to take action 
to ensure the safety and welfare of the nation and its citizens. However, it is likely that due 
to the complexity anarchic nature of cyberspace, some grey areas will always exist between 
domestic and international law.65 
Low Cost of Entry 
                                                             
58 Jared Cohen, and Eric Schmidt. “The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business”. 
California: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 2013, p 3 
59 Clarke & Knake, p 43 
60 Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyberspace and International Law: The Penumbral Mist of Uncertainty.” (Harvard Law 
Review, (2013): 176-180, p 177 
61 The Convention on Cybercrime is the first international treaty seeking to address Internet and computer 
crime by harmonizing national laws, improving investigative techniques, and increasing cooperation among 
nations. See Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001 on the website of the Council of Europe. 
62 Jack Goldsmith, and Tim Wu. “Who Controls the Internet: Illusions of a Borderless World”. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), supra note 86, at viii 
63 Libicki (2010), p 125. 
64 Schmitt (2013), p 177 
65 Owens, Dam and Lin (n 5) 251 
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Cyber-attacks are an attractive alternative to traditional state or criminal attacks due to the 
extremely low costs of entry in relation to potentially high returns on investment.66 Joseph 
Nye states that “the barriers to entry in the cyber domain are so low that non-state actors 
and small states can play significant roles at low levels of cost.”67 Physical equipment is 
inexpensive and widely available, and the necessary expertise is also becoming increasingly 
widespread. Perpetrators require little more than a laptop, Internet connection and 
downloadable tools available on the Internet to begin conducting attacks. This allows smaller 
states and non-state actors the ability to develop cyber capabilities at much lower cost than 
that required to develop conventional military or criminal capabilities.  
Anonymity 
Anonymity relates to the ability to attribute an attack to a specific source or perpetrator. 
Criminals operate in the cyber world partly to circumvent more conventional, established 
constructs such as international borders.68 Internet communication has not only facilitated 
the growth of legitimate business, but it has bolstered criminals’ abilities to operate in an 
environment where they can broaden their pool of potential targets and rapidly exploit their 
victims.69 Identifying perpetrators can be especially difficult in the cyber context due to the 
ability of attackers to mask their identity by “spoofing” their Internet Protocol (IP) address 
and obfuscating their identity by routing through a series of proxy servers or utilising a 
botnet.70 Operating behind false IP addresses, foreign servers and aliases, attackers can act 
with almost complete anonymity and relative impunity.71 Ronald K. Noble, Secretary-General 
                                                             
66 Catherine A. Theohary, “Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity,””, CRS Report for 
Congress,  (Washington D.C.,  Congressional Research Service, 17 March 2009) p. 3 
67 Nye, p 5 
68 Kristin Finklea, and Catherine Theohary. “Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. Law 
Enforcement,”, CRS Report for Congress,  (Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2013), 
p 5 
69 Cybercrime: Conceptual Issues for Congress and U.S. Law Enforcement, p 5 Ibid, p 5 
70 In a botnet attack a cybercriminal or attacker takes control of a foreign computer by surreptitiously loading 
software on it (without the consumer’s awareness that the computer has been compromised) in order to 
conduct attacks. Moreover, some botnets are huge, embracing tens of thousands of computers across the 
world so that attacks can seem, as in this case, to be coming from everywhere. See Stephen Blank ‘Web War I: 
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of Interpol since 2000, believes the anonymity of cyberspace makes it one of the most 
dangerous criminal threats faced by modern society.72  
Furthermore, the difficulty of attribution allows a degree of plausible deniability for the 
attacker. Perpetrators can cover their own tracks and implicate others, particularly when 
third-party servers and botnets in unrelated countries are used as the origin of attacks to 
provide cover for the actual attacker.73 Targeting by criminal elements is not the only threat 
presented by the rise of cyberspace. Internationally, the trend in cyber-crime has been 
described as shifting from ‘exploitation’ of existing networks and security weaknesses, to 
‘disruption’ and ‘destruction’.74 In other words, the cyber threat is changing from theft of 
personal and intellectual property, to denial of service attacks and destruction of computer 
networks. A key challenge for national security is the identification of the source of these 
attacks, thereby allowing the culprits to be brought to justice, or at the very least for the 
threat of the attack to be mitigated.  
7. Asymmetric Attack 
Tied to the low cost of entry, cyber-attacks are an attractive tool for waging asymmetric 
attack.75 Small states or non-state actors looking to conduct offensive operations outside 
existing international legal agreements and obligations, or at a low cost of entry, may be 
convinced to fight in cyberspace.76 As the 2008 Estonian attacks indicate, the Internet has 
become a powerful asymmetric tool for transnational groups who view themselves as 
disenfranchised and seek to intimidate the nation-states and other actors presumably 
responsible for their grievances.77 However, it is unclear that such groups have the same 
capacities as large governments. In spite the low costs of entry and relative anonymity that 
cyber-attacks provide, sophisticated attacks on targets such as military systems require 
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greater resources to mount, and it is generally the realm of large intelligence agencies to 
intrude physically and/or crack highly encrypted codes.78 A teenage hacker and a large 
government can both do considerable damage over the Internet, but that does not make 
them equally powerful in the cyber domain.79 However, while ‘hit and run’ cyber strikes by 
individuals are unlikely to bring governments or corporations to their knees, they can impose 
disproportionate costs of disruption to operations and to reputations with miniscule 
investment.80 
8. Methods of State Surveillance  
James Der Derian argues that the emergence of the ’Digital Age’ and the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 have in different ways “transformed the meaning and discourse of 
national security.”81 Historically, security has been seen as a core value and ultimate goal of 
state behaviour. Traditional analysis of security at the state level has focused on the military 
dimension, although the end of the Cold War has allowed for a burgeoning of security theory 
to include ideas about economic and environmental security. The need for security speaks to 
the hierarchy of human needs, primarily the need for survival as the highest point of the 
hierarchy. Just as an individual’s need for security increases with the threat to their physical 
survival, so too does a society or state’s necessity for security. With the rise and evolution of 
cyber-related terrorism, espionage and crime, there has seldom been a time that the 
prediction and intervention of attacks has had such important consequences. Rarely have 
Governments had to rely on such disparate and speculative data to prevent attacks that have 
the potential to cause widespread destruction or mass panic. Sufficient data must be 
collected to adequately empower a state to identify and prevent terrorist threats targeting 
its citizens, possessions or interests. Given the global nature of the Internet, these attacks 
can be domestic or international in origin.  
The collection of intelligence plays an important role towards ensuring governments have 
enough information to identify threats and make decisions relating to their national security 
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and survival. States, just like individuals, have a diverse range of security concerns, including 
material or resource concerns, threats or vulnerabilities, and institutional commitments. 
Governments maintain intelligence services to collect information that would otherwise be 
denied to them. Intelligence agencies also have a role in protecting the information of states 
that they would see denied to others. Governments are then able to act on this information 
collected or denied to other states through their foreign policy and interactions with extra-
state actors such as Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) or multinational corporations. 
Thus, the collection of intelligence relates specifically to a state’s national security, or ability 
to protect its national borders, possessions, citizens and interests.  
In this respect, intelligence collection is of prime importance to any modern international 
relations debate. Whether convert or overt, intelligence is the collection, protection, and 
analysis of both publicly available and secret information, with the goal of reducing policy 
maker’s uncertainty about a foreign policy problem. Policy makers face a great deal of 
uncertainty when crafting foreign policy, and in general terms lack information about a 
friend or foe’s capabilities or intentions. Timely and appropriate intelligence can address this 
uncertainty by providing information that confirms or at least reduces uncertainties as to 
another’s intentions and capabilities. The acquisition of confidential intelligence is the prime 
function of intelligence agencies, and can be gathered using traditional collection of 
information from other humans, or HUMINT, to more technical means such as signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) 
collection, whereby technology is utilised to exploit weaknesses.  
9. Social Contract  
Social contract theory was introduced by early modern thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is one of the most relevant pieces of literature 
when it comes to affirming the need for a state-ruled social order. Rousseau proposed a 
contract between individuals in society, the purpose of which was the protection of 
individual within the security of a community.82 Emmanuel Kant argued that individuals do 
not naturally live in communities and create law, but as rational actors they do so to profit 
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from the advantages of an established community.83 Individuals do not have an inherent 
right to leadership, but are appointed by the entire community only after the establishment 
of the social contract.84 Through this contract, the population is the sovereign of the state, 
and the government is established only to carry out the will of the sovereign and act as an 
arbitrator.85  
The social contract defines the responsibility of the state to maintain rights and security the 
security of its citizens, and lays the intellectual groundwork for a strong central government. 
Hobbes’ “The Leviathan” contends that in a state of nature, without benefit of law and law 
enforcement, life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."86 Hobbes argues that in this 
state “all men have a natural right to all things”, and without laws, man would be in a state 
of such liberty that there would be no limitations on his actions or behaviour.87 To ensure 
peace, man relinquishes some rights to the state as part of a social contract, and the state 
would possess a monopoly of force within the society. In doing so, the state is able to ensure 
the security of its citizens and interests. While many of man’s natural rights are lost through 
this process, such as renouncing the right to kill, the individual gains security for this trade-
off. Therefore, social contract theory advocates for a twofold responsibility between states 
and citizens, which is reflected in the United Nations Charter and domestic laws of various 
countries.88  
There is a broad consensus that state responsibilities are extended to cyberspace. In 2011, 
the United Nations declared access to the Internet to be a basic human right,89 and made 
clear the responsibilities of state to ensure the security of their citizens in cyberspace:  
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States have an obligation to protect individuals against interference by third 
parties that undermines the enjoyment of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression. This positive obligation to protect entails that States must 
take appropriate and effective measures to investigate actions taken by third 
parties, hold the persons responsible to account, and adopt measures to 
prevent such recurrence in the future.90 
10. Privacy 
In seemingly direct conflict with security and the collection of intelligence is the notion of 
privacy. Privacy is the presumption that individuals should have an area of autonomous 
development, interaction and liberty, a ’private sphere’ with or without interaction with 
others and free from state intervention, and free from excessive unsolicited intervention by 
other uninvited individuals. Privacy is more closely associated with democracy and liberalism 
than other competing political theories such as authoritarianism, communism or realism, 
due to the importance placed upon privacy. From a Liberal perspective, privacy is a pre-
eminent individual good due to its protection of anonymity, confidentiality, seclusion and 
intimacy – to name a few characteristics of privacy – which help foster the freedom and 
equality necessary for democratic politics by structuring and limiting competition for power 
in ways that enable people to see and treat each other as equal despite incompatible beliefs, 
interests and identities.  
The right to privacy has been recognised as a human right; although as with most 
international human rights, the right to privacy is not absolute. Absolute rights, such as 
freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
cannot be limited, suspended or restricted for any reason.91 The idea of a moral right to 
privacy is a relatively new concept, largely a product of the modern nation state. Previously 
there was no widely held belief that people had a right to privacy, moral or otherwise. While 
there was an expectation of privacy, the right to privacy was given adequate protection by 
other moral and legal rights up to that point. This is seen in the right to property, whereby an 
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individual’s home provided adequate protection from invasions of privacy simply by barring 
entry to others and thus preventing external parties from collecting private information 
without consent. Thus the right to privacy was derived from other enumerated rights.  
11. The Rise of Big Data 
While the tension between privacy and intelligence is not a new phenomenon, what is new is 
the scale at which data can now be easily and efficiently moved. What would have taken 
significant effort just twenty years ago can now be achieved with the click of a mouse. The 
modern world’s infatuation with all things electronic, including the Internet, social 
networking and mobile devices, has produced a vast amount of digital information that is 
held by public and private institutions alike. In terms of private information, the world has 
seen the most profound transformation of the availability and size of data ever experienced. 
Digital databases now contain a virtual plethora of data: financial, medical, educational, 
travel, locational, communications between parties, photographs of individuals and their 
associates, fingerprints and other biometrics such as iris-scans and DNA profiles. This data is 
a treasure trove for any analyst seeking to determine pattern of life, conduct network 
analysis, or identify persons of interest.  
As the 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review states, “cyberspace touches practically 
everything and everyone.”92 The parallel rise of ‘big data’ in the past decade has seen a 
further evolution of the concept of national security, particularly relevant in the age of 
popular social networking media. Intelligence collections and ‘big data’ presents huge 
challenges for privacy, security, regulation, and the power relationship between citizens and 
the state, potentially leading to “big data authoritarianism.”93 For example, in the 20th 
century SIGINT collection meant intercepting analogue signals carried along lines of 
communication that had two discrete and known target points. In the 21st century, 
communications are mostly digital, and can be carried globally upon any number of different 
systems that dynamically route billions of bits of data. The danger in the 21st century is the 
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use of tools that collect data with no focus, instead preferring to cast a wide net to capture 
as much data as possible. Taking advantage of the unparalleled availability of data available 
online, advances in computing have made it possible to extract, collate and analyse data in 
powerful and sophisticated ways that have significant implications for informational privacy. 
Two key techniques that are greatly facilitated by more powerful computer technology 
include ‘data matching’ and ‘data mining’. Data matching involves comparing data that 
comes from different sources and has been collected for different purposes. Data mining 
involves extracting information that is implicit in data sets, usually by discovering new 
relationships among the data elements.  
Both data matching and data mining can raise privacy concerns as they seek to uncover 
previously unknown information about people. However, the collection of this data by 
intelligence agencies does not necessarily diminish the privacy of individuals. Only a small 
fraction of the Internet’s traffic involves human-to-human communications such as email 
messages. Most Internet communications are communications between humans and 
computers, such as World-Wide-Web pages in transit, commands sent to remote servers, 
and file transfers. Many others are computer-to-computer communications, such as network 
administrative traffic that keeps the Internet running smoothly.94 However, the collection of 
metadata associated with communications can raise privacy concerns when the power of 
data matching and data mining programs are considered.  As stated by New Zealand’s 
Privacy Commissioner in 2013: 
“Metadata is not necessarily innocuous. It can provide a detailed map of a 
person’s life – such as tracking their location, contacts and interests. This is 
why it is valuable in the intelligence arena. But it is also why effective 
oversight is required to ensure that it is collected and used appropriately, not 
as the tool of mass surveillance that it has the capacity to be, if 
unchecked.”95  
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French military theorist Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph Ardant du Picq wrote that “the art of 
war is subjected to numerous modifications by industrial and scientific progress. But one 
thing does not change, the heart of man.”96 The intelligence documents leaked by Edward 
Snowden demonstrated the industrial scale at which highly-resourced intelligence agencies 
are now able to collect data. Additionally, while cyberspace may allow governments to 
collect data on a much larger scale, it has also allowed for a comparable increase in the 
ability of criminal organisations to conduct criminal activity on a mass scale. Criminal 
organisations are able to conduct sophisticated, targeted attacks across geographic borders 
with impunity. Security in the cyber age is no longer a special topic of exclusive concern to 
states as cyberspace has transferred risk and the responsibility for security from the state to 
non-state actors.  
Most citizens and private organisations simply do not know where or how to start preparing 
for these threats, with an additional challenge presented by the pace of technology, which 
results in constantly evolving threats. Although cyber-attacks directed at non-state actors 
may not involve the sophistication or resources of an attack directed towards national 
infrastructure or state agencies, corporations and citizens are increasingly exposed to 
advanced cyber-attacks simply due to the modern world’s increased dependence on 
cyberspace.  
12. Turning off Access 
Faced with the significant challenges that cyber-attacks pose, what security strategies can 
states follow to provide adequate security for their citizens? At the most basic level, a state 
can simply choose not to have any connection to the Internet, foregoing the significant 
benefits that Internet communications bring. To achieve this, states may institute 
mechanisms for the control or regulation of cyberspace by placing restrictions on incoming 
and outgoing Internet traffic. Examples of national ‘firewalls’ being constructed within states 
include China’s ‘Golden Shield Project’, also known as the new Great Wall of China. This 
system, which restricts Internet traffic using a sophisticated content-filtering regime 
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involving some 50,000 domestically-based servers,97 is intended to limit the circulation of 
‘objectionable’ information within the country. In essence China is attempting to build a 
secure national “intranet” independent of the Internet,98 which will act as a nationwide 
digital surveillance network, linking China’s national, regional and local security agencies 
together. Whether this can protect China from the threat of cyber-attack is questionable, 
with the firewall already failing due largely to the increased volume of Internet traffic in 
China.99 Other states have also attempted to shut off access to the Internet completely by 
blocking access to telecommunications infrastructure itself. This has occurred in 
authoritarian states such as Syria, Egypt and Libya during the Arab Spring. This 
unprecedented level of Internet censorship allowed the state to control information by 
effectively severing access to the global Internet.100 Another example is North Korea, which, 
while one of the most isolated countries in the world, still has Internet access. Rather than 
blocking content, Internet use in North Korea is essentially banned for all but the most 
powerful elites.  
Revelations of large-scale western surveillance have also pushed democratic countries such 
as Germany and Brazil to consider formulating national Internets. Germany’s Deutsche 
Telekom has sought to tighten security through ‘national routing’, which would see data 
generated in Germany and destined for local users exclusively handled by fibre-optic cables, 
routing gear, and computers within Germany.101 Brazil is pushing to force Internet 
companies such as Google and Facebook to store local data within the country’s borders, 
and to create an encrypted national e-mail service.102 
While these actions may prove effective at limiting the potential for cyber-attack from 
external sources, commentators have suggested that “a balkanization of the Internet is not 
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the solution and runs totally contrary to the basic principles of the Internet.”103  While the 
idea of strengthening states’ abilities to censor information transmitted over the Internet has 
appealed to authoritarian regimes, it flies in the face of free speech principles.104 Democratic 
states will typically pursue other security strategies before compromising the basic 
democratic tenets of freedom and free speech by restricting Internet access in this manner. 
13. Deterrence  
Deterrence is an example of a traditional security theory that can be used by states in 
cyberspace. Glenn Snyder classically defined deterrence as “discouraging the enemy from 
taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his 
prospective gain.”105 If deterrence is anything that dissuades an attack, it is usually said to 
have two components: deterrence by denial (the ability to frustrate the attacks) and 
deterrence by punishment (the threat of retaliation).106 Delving further, there are three 
approaches that must be applied to ensure deterrence is achieved. Firstly, a strong defence 
is needed to protect against the vast majority of aggressors and dissuade some from 
attacking at all.107 Secondly, the ability to attribute an attack to a specific source is important 
for maintaining credibility and ensuring legitimacy at home and abroad.108 Thirdly, an actor 
must project willingness and the capability to retaliate against attacks.109  
While classical deterrence theory focuses on nation states, cyber-attacks perpetrated by 
non-state actors such as terrorist or criminal groups pose a credible threat to individual and 
state national security, and are also subject to deterrence theory. However, as previously 
discussed, the nature of cyber-attacks presents difficulties in relation to each of the elements 
of deterrence. Firstly, the low cost, anonymity and scale of cyber-attacks makes defence 
against attacks difficult. No state has the resources necessary to identify, prevent and 
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retaliate against thousands of attacks per day.110 Attribution is equally difficult given the 
relatively anonymous nature of the cyber domain. Governments can launder their actions 
through individual users or groups, and individuals can hide behind technology that makes 
identification near impossible. Lastly retaliation, crucial to any deterrence theory, may 
present the greatest difficulty for states due to both these issues and a lack of established 
international law.111 
Although cyber deterrence is highly unlikely to eliminate the occurrence of all attacks, no 
matter how effective the implementation,112 it can play a critical role in reducing the total 
number of attacks to a manageable level at a relatively low cost.113 Consequently, resources 
that may otherwise be consumed would be available to pursue and prosecute any attacks 
that do slip through. To achieve this, states must continually communicate to ensure that 
deterrent messages are projected, received and understood, as deterrence is possible only 
when others have a good idea of the one’s capabilities and intentions. A measure of this 
communication is the development of effective domestic and international cyber legislation, 
in parallel with the development of cyber capabilities to ensure that cyber-attacks are 
effective at both defending against attacks and identifying perpetrators. 
14. Security Frameworks 
A further conceptual framework for state cyber-security may take the form of security 
alliances. To deter threats and ensure the security of citizens and national interests, states 
raise sufficient offensive or defensive capabilities to deter attack from other states or non-
state actors. To do so, states may engage in diplomacy or alliance-building to ensure 
enhance their security. Alliances may be temporary, or longer term, formalised and 
institutionalised security partnerships. For a small state, such as New Zealand, collective 
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security agreements are an avenue for access to greater resources and an important strategy 
to counter global threats such as cyber-attacks. 
The significant threat that cyber-attacks pose to state security has reignited the necessity for 
cooperation amongst security and intelligence partners. With globalisation, the international 
security environment has become more interdependent than ever before with the 
establishment of complex networks that make responding to and managing security 
challenges increasingly difficult, but increasingly necessary. Intelligence sharing between 
close allies through various bilateral and multilateral alliances is a routine form of 
international cooperation and security development. As a recent White House Cyberspace 
Strategy memo observed: 
“Enhancing national-level cybersecurity among developing nations is of 
immediate and long-term benefits [to the United States and all nations], as 
more states are equipped to confront threats emanating from within their 
borders and in turn, build confidence in globally interconnected networks 
and cooperate across borders to combat criminal misuse of information 
technologies. It is also essential to cultivating dynamic, international 
research communities able to take on next-generation challenges to 
cybersecurity.”114 
While literature detailing international intelligence cooperation is sparse due to the subject’s 
sensitive nature, there is no doubt that all intelligence services perform some kind of liaison 
function. Given the vast nature of potential threats to individual states, no single intelligence 
agency has all the resources – financial, human and technical – to be entirely self-sufficient in 
all areas. These multilateral agreements are based upon perceptions of common security 
between like-minded states seeking as close to absolute security as possible in an anarchical 
global society. 
An example of alliance building is the ‘Five Eyes’ security and intelligence alliance. Born of 
the United States and Britain’s intelligence collaboration during World War II, New Zealand, 
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Australia and Canada were added as secondary parties to the treaty that established areas of 
technical and intelligence cooperation between each state. In this collective security 
agreement, each nation seeks to reduce the prospects and scope of international aggression 
through preventative association of participating states to protect their joint security.  
A second conceptual security framework sees states participating in international institutions 
to encourage cooperative approaches towards shared security issues. While realists dismiss 
the importance of institutionalism, Robert Keohane argues that institutions are rooted in the 
realities of power and interest, and make a significant difference in conjunction with these 
power realities.115 Implicit in this approach are the notions that power itself has changed and 
that a nation’s military capabilities are not the sole factor in determining its security.116 
Rather than solely pursuing hard power approaches, institutionalism allows states to pursue 
soft power approaches to project its own foreign policy to influence the actions of other 
states. Institutionalism allows small states in particular to exhibit a firm commitment to 
international law, seek multilateral solutions to security issues and generally refrain from the 
use of military force to solve disputes.117  
The sharing of intelligence between states is an important form of international cooperation 
and alliance building. Such relationships are based upon trust, confidence and common 
goals. This concept of collective security is an important innovation of twentieth-century 
international relations, asserting that realists’ security dilemma can be overcome not 
through national self-help and the balance of power, but through the institution of 
communal commitments whereby states commit to joint actions against any external 
territorial or political threat to other states. This idea of a universal, permanent and 
collective agreement to oppose aggression and guarantee security is a founding tenet the 
United Nations. The effectiveness of this concept lies in the willingness of each member state 
to act against threats from aggressors. 
Thirdly, states may pursue a security model based on identity and norms. States can develop 
and spread norms as a means of influencing the behaviour of states by creating a “standard 
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of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.”118 Norms, including those that 
structure international affairs, are dynamic and capable of strengthening over time. Although 
cyberspace has been described as a discordant and chaotic sphere of conflict in which it is 
not yet obvious that a common framework of ethics, norms and values can apply,119 the 
emergence of cyber-security norms is occurring. Cyber-warfare norms are largely analogous 
with existing norms,120 and although not yet codified into international law, these may 
become international law in the future. Norms cannot be unnaturally imposed on states as 
the acceptance of a norm is largely dependent on the quality of the ethical argument 
underpinning its creation.121 This unfortunately means that norms often take significant 
periods of time and effort before they spread. As such it is unclear what effect norms against 
cyber-attacks will have.  
 
Section Two: New Zealand's Response to Cyber Threats 
15. New Zealand and the Rise of Cyber 
For a small, isolated state such as New Zealand, a well-functioning cyberspace provides 
important benefits. The Internet and other forms of digital communication enable New 
Zealanders to have global access to products and services and reduce our geographical 
isolation by connecting us with the rest of the world. Access to greater Internet bandwidth 
and wireless technology – in particular mobile devices such as smart phones – is 
transforming how New Zealanders access the Internet and how business is transacted in 
New Zealand.122 New Zealand’s Government and critical national infrastructure providers, 
including banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation and energy sectors, are 
more and more reliant on digital systems, with government agencies utilising the Internet, 
digital document management systems and shared online platforms in their day-to-day 
business. At least 75% of New Zealanders have access to the Internet at home, and they are 
increasingly communicating across the Internet, accessing government services online, and 
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using digital services to complete tasks such as submitting tax returns and making 
applications for passport renewals and student loans.123  
As far back as 2000, New Zealand governments have recognised the importance of the 
Internet as a worldwide revolution in information and communication technology. Under an 
e-government initiative, New Zealand introduced new information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) to the government sector in an attempt to achieve greater operational 
efficiency, transparency and effectiveness. Benefits of ICTs include faster, more streamlined 
administrative processing, lower transaction costs, better use of information resources, 
greater public access to government information and services, and more opportunities for 
public participation in democratic processes.124  
Parallel to the benefits that the Internet brings, so too does it bring a new set of security 
challenges for New Zealand. New Zealand’s geographic isolation has traditionally provided 
the country with some level of protection against attack. The lack of land borders and 
general physical remoteness make New Zealand much less vulnerable to attack than many 
other countries, which has in turn influenced the country’s security and national security 
policy. The 2010 Defence White Paper identified physical isolation as New Zealand’s principal 
source of protection against direct military threat from other states.125 The paper 
recognised, however, that this distance was no longer sufficient insulation from attack, 
especially given globalisation and technological reach.126  
Notwithstanding the growing threat of physical attacks in other parts of the world, the threat 
of physical attacks against New Zealand remains small. As New Zealand Member of 
Parliament (MP) Peter Dunne once observed “*New Zealand is+ not a hotbed of international 
terrorism, nor are we likely to become such a hotbed.”127 Yet the development of global 
communications has increased the threat of cyber-attack against New Zealand, with the 
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2010 Defence White Paper identifying cyber-attacks as a growing threat with potentially 
crippling consequences for New Zealand.128  
The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Statement of Intent to 2017 prioritised 
the development and implementation of robust cyber security strategies.129 In announcing 
changes to the legislation for New Zealand’s foreign intelligence agency, the Government 
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), Prime Minister John Key stated: 
While the terrorism threat in New Zealand has remained low, there are 
people within our country who have links to off-shore terrorist groups… And 
the many other threats to our national security have continued to intensify, 
these include cyber-attacks against Government and private organisations 
where information is at risk, and the intellectual property of some of our 
smartest and most innovative New Zealanders is at risk. There is evidence of 
cyber espionage in New Zealand (and) there have been covert attempts to 
acquire New Zealand science and technology for programmes relating to 
weapons of mass destruction or weapons delivery systems. Other threats we 
face include countries conducting foreign interference and espionage, this 
includes attempts to recruit individuals who have access to sensitive political 
or military secrets.130 
Furthermore, the establishment of the NCSC in 2011 shows that the New Zealand 
Government has been taking strategic challenge of cyber security seriously. The NCSC is 
responsible for the protection of government systems and information by planning for and 
responding to cyber incidents, and working with providers of critical national infrastructure 
to improve the protection and computer security of such infrastructure against cyber-borne 
threats.131 The NCSC’s goals are divided into three priority areas: increasing awareness to 
promote online security, protection of online infrastructure, and computer emergency 
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response.132 Its objectives are to raise understanding and awareness among small businesses 
and individuals, improve government cyber-security, and improve cyber-security in critical 
infrastructure. In 2013, the NCSC delivered a range of education initiatives to help increase 
New Zealand organisations’ preparedness to respond to cyber incidents and increase the 
resilience of New Zealand’s information networks and critical infrastructures.133  
As part of its functions, the NCSC receives and records cyber-security incidents that are 
reported against New Zealand targets.134 The NCSC 2012 Incident Report stated that in 2012 
there was an increase in the number of incidents reported, from a total of 90 in 2011 to a 
total of 134 in 2012.135 The largest category of reported activity was ‘scam & spam’ related, 
which made up 31% of the incidents captured. Denial of service (DoS) attacks and 
botnet/malware activity were the second largest categories, making up 16% and 14% of 
incidents respectively.136 Of these, 60% of the incidents reported to NCSC originated from an 
overseas source; (31%) of reported incidents originated from domestic sources; and 9% of 
incidents were unable to be attributed to a specific origin.137 Almost three-quarters of these 
attacks were directed against individuals and private sector organisations, with less than a 
quarter directed at government or critical national infrastructure.138 
International data suggests that 133,000 New Zealanders per annum are victims of identity 
fraud (the majority of cases having a cyber-element), with around one third of that number 
falling victim to identity theft and two thirds falling victim to credit or bank card fraud.139 A 
2011 global economic crime survey ranked New Zealand as fourth out of 78 countries in 
terms of reported fraud.140 Of these, cyber-crime was responsible for almost a quarter of the 
reported fraud events. The NCSC estimates New Zealanders lose up to $500m annually due 
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to cyber-borne frauds and scams,141 with 70% of New Zealand adults having fallen victim to 
some form of cyber-crime in the form of computer scams, fraud and viruses/malware.142 
Other reports conservatively estimated that cyber-related crimes cost New Zealand 
enterprise an estimated $625 million in 2011.143 The cost of loss of intellectual property as a 
result of cyber intrusions into private sector entities is exceptionally difficult to quantify in 
monetary terms, in part because companies are reluctant to report losses or may not even 
know their property has been stolen. However, based on the scale of intrusions and 
exfiltration seen in other jurisdictions and the number of intrusions reported in New Zealand, 
the potential costs to New Zealand of cyber-based industrial espionage are likely to be 
significant.  
More broadly, the impact of cyber threats to New Zealand is difficult to calculate with any 
precision, partly because of the complex nature of any potential attack. If a major attack 
were directed at government agencies, critical national infrastructure providers (for example 
telecommunications networks or water supply), or companies that drive New Zealand’s 
economy, there could be significant disruption to commercial and personal activities.144 The 
use of botnets or targeting of individuals would also add significant costs and disruptions at a 
personal level rather than at a state level. A recently conducted study determined that 
globally, cyber-crime and cyber espionage result in up to one trillion US dollars in annual 
global losses.145  
16. New Zealand Cyber-Security Strategies 
As a small state dependant on foreign trade and a liberal rules-based international system, 
New Zealand’s foreign policy has varied between alliances, institutional cooperation and 
norm promotion. Membership of security alliances such as the Five Eyes alliance allows New 
Zealand to compensate for its small size and lack of global reach, and enables New Zealand 
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to be a better informed player on the world stage than would otherwise be the case.146 
Intelligence collection and dissemination are important approaches that can increase New 
Zealand’s ability to deter attacks, or identify perpetrators and retaliate if necessary. New 
Zealand has two central intelligence collection agencies: the GCSB and the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS). New Zealand’s main contributing government agency to 
the Five Eyes intelligence system is the GCSB, which shares information with its partner 
agencies abroad, including the NSA, GCHQ, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), and 
Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE).  
GCSB is responsible for SIGINT with a foreign focus. The agency does not have the legislative 
ability to spy on New Zealanders independently unless certain criteria are met, such as the 
individual being designated an ‘agent of a foreign power’. The NZSIS is responsible for New 
Zealand’s HUMINT collection, and is unique amongst the Five Eyes in having both a domestic 
and foreign focus.  
Given the high costs of intelligence collection, membership of the Five Eyes provides a very 
substantial net economic benefit to New Zealand.147 As the smallest member state in terms 
of both geographic and economic size, this security alliance grants New Zealand access to 
intelligence resources far beyond the capabilities of a small states, and is a strong signal of 
deterrence for potential aggressors. 
While New Zealand may be the net beneficiary of this agreement, the cooperation between 
these countries is of value to each partner as none of the Five Eyes states would be able to 
operate a global system on its own. Indeed, the relationships fostered by this alliance are 
crucial to the United States’ effort to secure its homeland, and necessary to its fight against 
terrorism. New Zealand’s intelligence and military cooperation with these partners has 
recently been reinvigorated with the reinstatement of New Zealand to the Five Eyes148 and 
the military and intelligence agreements known as the Wellington Declaration (2010) and 
Washington Declaration (2012).  
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More broadly, New Zealand has focused on extending international security alliances on 
cyber-security. In June 2012, New Zealand entered into an Individual Partnership 
Cooperation Programme with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which provides 
for consultation and cooperation on cyber-security issues and continued intelligence 
sharing.149 Agreements have also been entered into with the UK and Australia. Domestically, 
the New Zealand Government has also entered into partnerships with private sector 
enterprises, ensuring that the benefit of these international partnerships provides benefit to 
the entire spectrum of New Zealand national infrastructure and intellectual property 
protection. UNSC Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) specifically oblige New Zealand 
to take action against those terrorist entities it lists.150 This includes co-operating with the 
UN and its member states, and supporting the numerous resolutions ratified by the UN that 
aim to suppress international terrorism, including ratifying eight of the 12 conventions in the 
decades prior to the new millennium.151 UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001),152 adopted on 28 
September 2001, voiced the UN’s unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks and 
reaffirmed the need to combat by all means.153 The resolution was adopted in accordance 
with the UN Charter regarding threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts, and was binding on all UN member states.154 The resolution obliges New Zealand to 
outlaw the financing of, participation in and recruitment to, terrorist entities.155 Among 
other tasks, this resolution obligated all member states to enact “additional measures to 
prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and 
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preparation of any acts of terrorism.”156 The resolution does not specifically identify those 
terrorist entities, so effectively leaves it to member states to identify the entities against 
which they should act.157 The resolution imposed a binding obligation under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, and was regarded as one of the “one of the most strongly worded 
resolutions in the history of the Security Council.”158  
The resolution had significant consequences for both international and New Zealand 
domestic law and laid the foundation for anti-terrorism legislation in the years to come. The 
meaning, scope, and implementation strategy of UNSC Resolution 1373 immediately became 
part of a considerable debate among New Zealand policy-makers, as well as their 
counterparts around the world Its effects are still being felt over a decade later, not only in 
terms of the legislation that has been enacted, but also due to the urgency and extent to 
which UN member states were required to amend existing domestic law to comply with the 
provisions of the resolution. 
17. New Zealand’s Security Legislation 
Yet for all the focus on countering international terrorism, there remains a decided absence 
of broad institutional cooperation and cyber-security norms to address the increasing threat 
of cyber-attacks. In order to respond to these growing challenges, New Zealand has taken 
steps to enhance its domestic cyber-security capacity.159 In many cases, New Zealand did not 
have relevant security legislation that could address the emerging cyber threats, or if it did it 
predated the modern debate on privacy and security by many years. New legislation was not 
enacted simultaneously but was instead brought into law progressively, building upon the 
advances of prior legislation or seeking to address new technologies or threats that were not 
previously covered. To understand the effect on privacy and security, this thesis will now 
examine the major legislative changes that have occurred in New Zealand since the 
September 2001 attacks on the US: 
Terrorist Suppression Act 2002 
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The Terrorist Suppression Act was passed in late 2002 and is considered New Zealand’s first 
legislative reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks.160 This is worth noting as 
subsequent cyber-focused legislation used this Act as its foundation, which will be discussed 
shortly. First introduced to Parliament as the Terrorism (Bombing and Financing) Bill in April 
2001 (pre 9/11), it proposed to criminalise the financing of terrorist acts and use of explosive 
devices in accordance with these international conventions. These were comparatively 
uncontroversial goals, reflected by the fact that, despite a public invitation, the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee considering the Bill received no submissions on it.161 
Before the Bill could be presented before Parliament, the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the US occurred. The force and devastation of the attack rippled across the globe, 
with calls for the use of all necessary force to counter the threat of global terrorism.162 New 
Zealand joined with these calls during the first sitting of Parliament following the attacks, 
and, with the exception perhaps of the Green Party, issued passionate calls for support of 
forceful international efforts against terrorism immediately following the attacks.163  
Following those tragic events, the members of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee were called upon to review the adequacy of the original terrorism Bill that they 
had been preparing to submit to the House of Representatives.164 The Chairperson of the 
Committee at the time, Graham Kelly, called the terror attack “horrifying” and notes that it 
destroyed preconceived ideas of security and stability in the world: “It was like tearing down 
everything and starting from scratch.”165 The Bill was subsequently sent back for further 
review, and major proposed amendments were introduced by way of a Supplementary 
Order Paper.166 This time the proposed Bill received significant comment from the public and 
civil liberties groups, with 140 submissions being received. The Bill was seen by some as 
having "a major chilling effect on dissent", or, even more troubling, as being "one giant step 
towards a police state".167 Objections to the Bill were directed at the obligations and powers 
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that it proposed for the NZSIS, GCSB and Police, the ability to designate individuals as 
terrorists, and new surveillance obligations placed on banks, financial organisations and 
lawyers.168 
Despite these concerns, the Bill became law in late 2002 with few significant changes. This 
gave effect to New Zealand’s obligations under the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, the International Convention for the Suppression of 
Financing of Terrorism 1999, and many of New Zealand’s obligations under UNSC Resolution 
1373.169 Police would take the lead role in initiating the process of designating individuals as 
terrorists, and after collecting, collating, assessing and analysing relevant data, would make a 
preliminary decision that would then be released for consultation with other relevant 
government departments. Wilkes publicity of the station, Muldoon was forced to publically 
admit to the existence and role of the GCSB about two months later.170 Unlike the SIS, the 
GCSB did not have its own Act of Parliament and operated without statutory basis until 2003.  
Counter-Terrorism Bill 2003  
The Counter-Terrorism Bill 2003 was designed to complement the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002 by closing potential gaps that may be exploited by terrorists,171 and ensure that New 
Zealand had a comprehensive legislative framework in place to help to prevent, and to deal 
with, terrorist offending.172 The Bill introduced new terrorism-related offences and penalties, 
and greatly extended state powers to lawfully intercept private communications where 
terrorist offences were suspected.173 Unlike the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, the 2003 
Counter-Terrorism Bill was much more broadly focused and was “a further step by this 
Government to ensure that we have in place a full range of measures to prevent or respond 
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to any effort by terrorists to operate here in our country.”174 A range of new criminal 
offences were also proposed, although not all of these were specific to terrorism.175 These 
proposals implemented into New Zealand law the requirements of two international 
conventions: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, and included 
provisions from UNSC Resolution 1373.176 Furthermore, to assist Police investigations of 
terrorist incidents, the Bill proposed a range of measures including permitting Police 
executing a search warrant to require a person, under threat of criminal penalty, to provide 
information or assistance that was deemed ’reasonable and necessary’ to allow access to a 
computer on premises covered by the warrant.177  
A number of the Bill’s provisions drew concern from prominent civil liberties 
groups.178 These concerns primarily focused on the use of tracking devices to 
covertly track the movement of individuals. 179 Until that time, New Zealand had not 
legislated standards for the use of most types of technologically-assisted physical 
surveillance for law enforcement purposes, unlike many comparable jurisdictions.180 
The Privacy Commissioner of the time, Bruce Slane, neatly summarised the privacy 
concerns in stating 
“The use of electronic devices to secretly track the movement of individuals is 
worrying from a privacy viewpoint. The ability to travel without being 
systemically observed, and not to have to account for every movement to the 
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State, are important freedoms. Freedom from surveillance is such an 
ordinary expectation that one hardly gives a thought to it. However, to 
become aware that one is, or has been, under surveillance is a devastating 
blow to a sense of privacy, dignity, and autonomy.”181  
Despite these concerns, the Privacy Commissioner supported the enactment of the 
legislation as the need for judicial authorisation, by way of a tracking warrant, was an 
important protection. Judges were “experienced, thoughtful and intelligent people, 
independent from the surveillance organisations” who were required to consider privacy 
when considering a warrant application.182 
Twenty-five public submissions were received on the Bill, including submissions from legal 
experts and civil liberties groups.183 These submissions were largely against the Bill due to its 
fundamental impact on privacy and civil liberties, despite advice from Crown Law that the Bill 
was consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.184 And 
although widely accepted by Parliament, the bill drew significant criticism from the Green 
Party. The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee considering the Bill recommended 
a number of amendments, including under the clause requiring persons to help Police armed 
with a warrant to access a computer, where persons would not be forced to provide any 
information tending to incriminate them, but might be required to provide information or 
assistance that would enable Police to access a computer containing information that may 
be incriminating.185 
The Green Party alleged that requiring persons to provide information or assistance to 
enable Police to access computer files violated the long-held common law privilege against 
self-incrimination, stating that “it is contradictory that the Bill… allow*s+ a suspect to 
withhold ‘information tending to incriminate’ yet not apply that provision to information 
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sitting on the suspect’s computer.”186 The Green Party believed that this provision may lead 
to ‘fishing expeditions’ to check for evidence of criminal behaviour on a suspect’s 
computer.187 Together with further concerns about the designation of terrorist groups 
proposed by the Bill, the Green Party was first and foremost seeking to protect rights of 
activists to protest.188 In a speech to Parliament, Green Party MP Keith Locke stated: 
“There is a growing recognition in New Zealand and around the world that 
the so-called war against terrorism is being used for unjustified restrictions 
on civil liberties… We do not need to undermine civil liberties in the fight 
against terrorism. To do so is to concede a point to the terrorists, whose aim 
is to restrict civil liberties, not increase them. I think that we should not, 
under the guise of counter-terrorism - as in this bill - introduce general 
changes to our criminal law that restrict and undermine the civil liberties 
that we have long enjoyed: the right to avoid self-incrimination; the right to 
privacy in our life, including today in our computer files; the right not to be 
tracked throughout our travels; and the right to freedom of speech and 
protest without being subject potentially to designation as a terrorist by a 
political figure such as a Prime Minister under the Terrorism Suppression 
Act.”189 
The Green Party’s fervent argument against the Bill had some effect; the Bill was divided and 
enacted as six separate bills, one for each statute the Bill would amend:  
 the Crimes Amendment Bill 2003 
 the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill 2003 
 the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill 2003 
 the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 2003 
 the Sentencing Amendment Bill 2003  
 the Summary Proceedings Amendment Bill 2003. 
                                                             
186 Ibid, p 34 
187 “Counter-Terrorism Bill: Second Reading.” (Hansard (debates), vol. 612, week 39, October 14, 2003). 
www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/debates/debates/47HansD_20031014_00001157/counter-terrorism-bill-
%E2%80%94-second-reading, p 1 
188 Ibid, p 1 
189 Ibid 
 43 
 
 All parties but the Greens ultimately supported each Bill on its third reading, with the 
exception of the Summary Proceedings Bill, which also was opposed by the ACT Party’s eight 
members.190 
Crimes Amendment Act 2003 
In September 1999, the New Zealand Government introduced the Crimes Amendment Bill 
(No 6) to update the Crimes Act 1961.191 Initially the Bill contained a range of proposed 
changes to update the Crimes Act, and proposed a number of provisions relating to crimes 
involving the use of computers. The proposed changes addressed the findings of a 1999 Law 
Commission report that found that “the current criminal law was inadequate to deal with the 
unauthorised interception of electronic data.”192 The Law Commission report, titled 
“Computer Misuse”, referred to a situation where the effects of computer misuse may be 
felt in New Zealand even though neither the hacker nor the computer were situated within 
the country, citing the following case as an example of where this had occurred: 
“Recently in New Zealand there have been two widely publicised incidents 
involving computer misuse. In November 1998, a computer hacker erased 
some 4,500 “Ihug” websites. The Ihug server was based in California and the 
sites were hosted by Auckland-based Internet service provider, the Internet 
Group. There was no backup facility and, unless the owners of the websites 
made their own copies, the web pages were lost permanently.”193 
The report noted that New Zealand did not have criminal offences dealing specifically with 
such conduct, and that the criminal offences that existed might have been perceived as 
inadequate to deal with computer misuse.194 The Law Commission recommended that “new 
offences dealing specifically with computer misuse should be created and that such offences 
should be located in a separate statute or in a distinct part of the Crimes Act 1961”,195 and 
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suggested that four offences be created in regards to the unauthorised interception, access, 
use or damage of data stored in a computer.196 
In November 2000, Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) No 85 was introduced to Parliament. 
Dubbed the ‘cyber snooping bill’,197 the SOP significantly changed the nature and scope of 
the changes initially proposed by the Crime Amendment Bill (No 6). Section 16B established 
the offence of using a listening device to intercept a private conversation, although 
exempting the NZSIS and GCSB from these offences. This effectively allowed the NZSIS and 
GCSB to access data without authorisation other than an interception warrant. Critics argued 
that the SOP significantly increased state surveillance powers by exempting these major 
state agencies from the computer hacking offences proposed in the 1999 Crimes 
Amendment Bill.198 While an exemption for the NZSIS already existed under the 1961 Crimes 
Act,199 the inclusion of the GCSB was of concern as the GCSB was at the time not legislated.  
A report from the Privacy Commissioner supported the SOP for broadening "crimes against 
personal privacy" by including the interception of non-oral private communications within 
the prohibition against intercepting private communications, and creating a new offence of 
accessing a computer system without authorisation.200 However, the report saw the 
proposed exceptions for the GCSB as representing a risk to privacy, stating:  
“I accept that there is a case to create appropriate exemptions to these new 
laws. It is essential that covert interception and computer access be limited 
to the level absolutely necessary to enable the relevant agencies to perform 
their proper functions. It must be subject to careful authorisation processes 
and operational controls, and be proportionate to the intrusion on privacy. 
My principal concerns about the bill relate to the exemptions and, in 
particular, to die lack of controls on ISPs and GCSB in relation to the 
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expanded interception offence, and to the law enforcement and GCSB 
exemption in relation to the computer access offence. In each case, I suggest 
law changes which would more appropriately protect privacy while allowing 
such exemptions.”201 
and further 
“I have two principal concerns at granting GCSB this exemption. First, 
although the Bureau is an important government intelligence agency it is not 
established by any statute. This lack of a statutory basis means that 
Parliament has had little say as to the constitution and activities of the 
agency and Parliament and the public has no real way of knowing precisely 
who GCSB is or what it does. If GCSB were to completely change the 
character of its activities next week, the public and Parliament would be 
unaware of whether it was continuing to fulfil a function for which an 
exemption from the criminal law is warranted. Placing GCSB on a statutory 
basis would bring benefits in terms of certainty, transparency and 
accountability depending upon how the statute were to be written.”202 
The report proposed that, as a prerequisite to granting an exemption for the GCSB, the 
agency be placed on a statutory footing and be “subject to a statutory warrant process for 
the undertaking of any intrusive activity, particularly where that activity would constitute a 
breach of the law.”203 Submitted to the Minister of Justice in December 2000, the report 
noted that a GCSB statute had already been proposed, namely the Government 
Communications Security Bureau Act. The GCSB received royal assent on 1 April 2003, with 
the Crimes Amendment Act receiving royal assent just months later on 7 July 2003.204 
Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003 
Until the establishment of the GCSB, New Zealand’s SIGINT capability and technical security 
(TECSEC) had been provided by bodies such as the New Zealand Defence Force and the 
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NZSIS.205 The Government of Prime Minister Robert Muldoon established the GCSB in 1977, 
and these functions became the responsibility of a sole agency (although the NZDF and NZSIS 
still retained some of their previous capabilities in this respect).206 The GCSB’s existence was 
not disclosed to Cabinet and the Leader of the Opposition until 1980, and even then its 
SIGINT capability was not revealed. The public first learned of the agency’s existence in 1984 
when peace researcher Owen Wilkes revealed the existence of a GCSB radio communications 
interception facility in Manawatū, known as the Tangimoana station.207 The station had been 
opened in late 1981 and kept a secret from the New Zealand public. Its existence was only 
revealed by chance, when Wilkes accidentally discovered the station while holidaying on a 
friend's farm nearby.208 According to New Zealand writer Nicky Hager, “after years of 
research into intelligence issues in Europe, Wilkes was probably the only person in New 
Zealand who could have recognised the distinctive signals intelligence aerials as being 
something different from the normal radio facilities providing communications for the 
nearby Air Force base.”209 Following Wilkes’ publicity of the station, Muldoon was forced to 
publically admit the existence and role of the GCSB.210 
Unlike the NZSIS, the GCSB did not have its own Act of Parliament and operated without 
statutory basis until 2003. In early 2000 it was decided that the GCSB should be placed on a 
statutory footing similar to that of the NZSIS, and the legislative and public consultation 
process began.211 This culminated in the 2003 Government Communications Security Bureau 
Act being enacted in late 2003. Under the Act, the objective of the GCSB was to contribute to 
the national security of New Zealand, the international relations and well-being of New 
Zealand, and the economic well-being of New Zealand.212 To accomplish these objectives, 
the functions of the GCSB were identified as information assurance and cybersecurity, 
intelligence gathering and analysis, and co-operation with other entities to facilitate their 
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functions.213 This gave the GCSB jurisdiction to collect, decipher, translate, examine and 
analyse any foreign communication emanating from a foreign organisation.214 Additionally, 
although the GCSB was not permitted to monitor the communications of New Zealand 
citizens or organisations, it was able to assist other New Zealand government agencies acting 
under judicial warrant to do so, and could also monitor any New Zealanders deemed to be 
an “agent of a foreign power”.215 
The Act formalised the role of the GCSB as the national authority for signals intelligence and 
information systems security.216 As with the NZSIS, the minister in charge of the GCSB was 
the Prime Minister, but further external oversight was provided by the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security Act 1996217 and the Intelligence and Security Committee Act 
1996.218 While New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner, Human Rights Commission, and Law 
Society all favoured formalising the GCSB’s role and functions by way of statute, others were 
not convinced.219 The Green Party was completely opposed as they saw ‘legalising’ the GCSB 
posed a ‘major threat’ to individual privacy and undermined the independence of New 
Zealand’s foreign policy.220  
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004 
Introduced to Parliament in 2003, the 2004 Telecommunications (Interception Capability) 
Act was an important precedent in New Zealand legislation as for the first time it legislated 
the lawful interception of data as a form of communication. The Act was a companion to the 
section of the 2003 Crimes Amendment Bill (no 6) that required telecommunications 
network operators to have all their systems intercept capable, and sought to achieve greater 
effectiveness in New Zealand’s law enforcement and security.  
The Act obligated telecommunications companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
have an interception capability and to assist surveillance agencies acting under an 
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interception warrant.221 New Zealand’s surveillance agencies acting under a judicial 
interception warrant were now allowed to access to the emails, Internet browsing, calls, 
texts and location for mobile phones of private citizens and businesses. Previously, 
interception warrants had been limited to voice communication or the ability to implant 
listening devices. Pursuant to section 7(1) and section 16(1)(a) of the 2004 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act, public switched telephone network were 
required to be compliant within 18 months of the Act’s commencement, and public data 
networks by April 2009.222 NZ$7.92 million was budgeted for in the Police appropriations 
budget for the period of 2007 – 2010 to subsidise companies wiring surveillance devices into 
their telecommunications networks.223  
Importantly, the Act did not in any way alter the authority of Police or intelligence and 
security agencies to intercept telecommunications, nor did it reduce the checks and balances 
on how these agencies accessed and used private communications information.224 Instead, 
ISPs were presented with an interception warrant and collected the relevant data, 
forwarding this on to the appropriate authorities.225 This important detail ensures 
intelligence agencies are not granted full access data held by ISPs, but instead are only 
granted access to relevant data they are legally entitled to under warrant. Despite this, the 
Act drew its fair share of detractors. The Green Party opposed that law on the grounds that it 
gave New Zealand’s intelligence agencies great powers to spy on New Zealanders' online 
activity.226 Civil Liberties Council spokesman Michael Bott said the new surveillance 
capabilities were part of a step-by-step erosion of civil rights in New Zealand.227 “The fear is 
that citizens become accustomed to living in a surveillance society and, over time, freedoms 
of speech and belief are chilled and diminished.”228 Yet the Act included the principle that 
the privacy of telecommunications that are not subject to an interception warrant or any 
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other lawful interception authority must be maintained to the extent provided for in law,229 
and the principle that the interception of telecommunications, when authorised under an 
interception warrant or any other lawful interception authority, must be carried out without 
unduly interfering with any telecommunications.230  
Nicky Hager claimed that the Act was the result of a decade of lobbying by American 
agencies such as the FBI.231 This claim was based upon an investigation completed by British 
researchers that had unveiled a move by the European Union to create a “seamless web of 
telecommunications surveillance” across Europe.232 Known as Enfopol 98, the plan involved 
EU nations adopting the “International User Requirements for Interception (IUR)” to 
standardise surveillance capabilities. This would allow the data including credit card 
numbers, Personal Identification Number (PIN) codes, email addresses, and computer logon 
identities and passwords to be passed between EU nations. Hager claimed New Zealand had 
been in discussion with the US and European authorities on joining the scheme from as early 
as 1995.233 
Police Association vice-president Stuart Mills said that the breadth of the new capabilities 
was justified because “criminal networks are using the Internet and other new technologies 
to communicate.”234 In a 2001 Cabinet committee policy paper, Police said that the NZSIS 
was “impeded in its ability to intercept or decrypt an increasing number of communications”, 
which restricted the NZSIS’s ability “to contribute to the international effort to restrict 
terrorism.”235 
New Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner at the time, Marie Shroff, warned Ministers through a 
Cabinet committee paper that modifying telecommunications networks for Police and 
intelligence agencies impacted on privacy by providing “enhanced opportunities for 
unauthorised interceptions by third parties.”236 This danger was highlighted by what was 
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known as the Greek Watergate. In 2004 and 2005, hackers gained access to Vodafone 
Greece’s mobile system and to the built-in law enforcement interception capability, tapping 
months of calls of more than 100 mobile phones.237 While the identities of the perpetrators 
were never conclusively established, it was suspected that US intelligence agencies operating 
from the US Embassy in Athens were to blame.238 This served as an important warning of the 
danger of intelligence agencies operating without proper oversight and legislative control. 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 2011 
The Government introduced the NZSIS Amendment Bill under urgency to Parliament in 
December 2010, with the aim of updating and clarifying the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969.239 The Bill modernised the warrant framework that applied to 
the NZSIS, specifically addressing technological changes and other factors that affected the 
value of the NZSIS seizure and interception warrants framework in the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969.240 The proposed amendments ensured the law clearly 
identified the types of surveillance practices that could be lawfully utilised by the NZSIS, and 
the authorisations that were required.241 The prevalent use of mobile phones and the 
Internet, and the ability to hide behind cyber-identities, had not been anticipated when the 
framework was outlined in the NZSIS Amendment Act 1977, and amongst several new 
definitions included in the Bill, the following definition of the term “facility” was provided: 
“*A+n electronic address, phone number, account, electronic identifier or 
similar identifier, or device that enables: communications to take place 
between individuals; or communications to be sent to or from an identified 
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individual; or documents to be processed, stored, or accessed; and includes, 
without limitation, any of the following: a unique device identifier; a user 
account identifier; an Internet Protocol address; an email address; an 
Internet storage account (Part 1, Clause 5, definition of ‘facility’)”242 
This provision allowed for warrants to be granted where specific facilities were known but 
the name or physical location of a subject was not known. This provision was deemed “a 
necessary update in an age where the use of attributable mobile phones and cyber-identities 
is common.”243  
The proposed amendments were considered by some as long overdue in light of the 
significant technological advances that had occurred over the previous four decades. The 
regulatory impact statement by noted that “*a+spects of the NZSIS warrant framework, while 
remaining somewhat workable, have not kept pace with new technologies, law change, or 
modern requirements for intelligence acquisition.”244 The Law Commission noted that 
“*w+hile there are some impacts on privacy, this is clearly justified by the associated benefits. 
In particular, updating the warrant framework is a recognition of technological changes in 
the storage of and communication of information, and is essential in order to enable the 
NZSIS to continue to effectively undertake its statutory functions.”245 
The regulatory impact statement prepared for the Intelligence and Security Committee 
considering the Bill identified six high priority amendments that, under the existing Act, 
required greater clarification.246 These ranged from clarifying the ability of the NZSIS to use 
electronic tracking devices, through to allowing greater flexibility in naming people assisting 
the NZSIS under warrant.247 It also included greater clarification in the area of computer-
based surveillance. Under section 253 of the Crimes Act 1961, the NZSIS was provided a 
qualified exemption to the “access without authorisation” offence.248 The report offered that 
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the proposed amendments would “remove uncertainty for New Zealand intelligence 
agencies and other agencies acting under warrant.”249  
Notably, the amendments did not propose to change the framework within which the NZSIS 
operated or seek to alter the thresholds associated with the issue of warrants.250 The Bill 
instead offered additional checks and balances to address what was considered powers that 
posed greater risks to individual privacy. These additional checks included the proposal to 
increase oversight on the warrants approval process by requiring that all NZSIS warrant 
applications to be approved by both the Commissioner of Security Warrants (a retired High 
Court Judge) and the Minister in charge of the NZSIS.251 Under the existing legislation, dual 
approval was required only in respect of warrant applications for the surveillance of NZ 
citizens and residents. This proposal added “the independent and quasi-judicial” authority of 
the Commissioner of Security Warrants to the warrants process, with the intention of 
considerably strengthening accountability and oversight.252 
Given its controversial nature, the Bill was not without its detractors. The Intelligence and 
Security Committee considering the Bill received and considered twenty-three submissions 
from interested groups and individuals regarding the Bill, and privately heard seven 
submissions in Wellington.253 In a submission by the Human Rights Commission, Chief 
Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan recognised the need to update the warrants scheme and 
address technology, but remained apprehensive about the Bill’s potential to dilute existing 
accountability and undermine democratic human rights protections.254 The Commission 
recommended including an explicit reference to human rights principles in the Bill to address 
“the concerns of those (and there are many) who consider that our society, and other 
                                                             
249 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill — First Reading (C, Chris Finlayson) 
250 Ibid, p 10 
251 Ibid, p 5 
252 Ibid 
253 “Submissions, advice and report to the House on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment 
Bill”, (17 May 2011). Accessed  January 18 2014, www.parliament.nz/en-
nz/pb/legislation/bills/isc/49DPMCISC_SUB_00DBHOH_BILL10486_1/submissions-advice-and-report-to-the-
house-on-the-new 
254 Rosslyn Noonan, “New Zealand Security intelligence Service Amendment Bill”, (Wellington: Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner, 31 March 2011), Accessed January 06 2014. www.hrc.co.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/Submission_NZ_SIS_Amendment_-Bill_Mar_31_2011.pdf, p 3 
 53 
 
comparable societies, are rapidly becoming ever more encompassing surveillance 
societies.”255 
Following consideration by the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner, the Intelligence 
and Security Committee recommended a set of principles be included under which the NZSIS 
was required to act in accordance with performing its functions under the Act. These 
principles broadly outlined the agency’s requirement to act in New Zealand’s interests, and 
act in accordance with New Zealand law and all human rights standards recognised by New 
Zealand law.256 Section 4AAA was inserted into the Bill, stating:  
“In performing its functions under this Act, the Security Intelligence Service… 
(a) contributes to keeping New Zealand society secure, independent, and free 
and democratic: (b) contributes to the participation of New Zealand in the 
maintenance of international security:” as part of our obligations, and “(c) 
acts—(i) in accordance with New Zealand law and all human rights 
standards 
Except to the extent that they are, in relation to national security, modified 
by an enactment: (ii) in the discharge of its operational functions, 
independently and impartially: (iii) with integrity and professionalism: (iv) in 
a manner that facilitates effective democratic oversight.”257 
The proposed principles provided guidance to the NZSIS when applying aspects of the 
legislation to its surveillance work, providing explicit recognition of those matters including 
human rights that should guide its work.258 However, these principles created no obligation 
or duty on any person, and in particular, “this addition to the Act does not oblige the Security 
Intelligence Service to be guided, in its ‘working’, by the matters referred to (including 
‘human rights standards’).”259 
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Prior to its introduction to Parliament, the Bill was reviewed by the Ministry of Justice. The 
Ministry stated in a report to the Attorney-General that the proposed changes recognised 
the need to adequately provide for national security by enabling the use of operational 
techniques against sophisticated security subjects. Moreover, the changes reflected 
technological changes in the storage and communication of information, and were a 
necessary and reasonable extension of the intelligence warrant framework in an age where 
the use of mobile phones and cyber-identities were prevalent.260 The report noted that the 
intelligence warrant framework, as amended by the Bill, would still be subject to the 
safeguards set out in the Bill of Rights Act, and would attract the direct attention of formal 
oversight authorities. In particular, for NZSIS to exercise powers of entry, a warrant based on 
sworn evidence would be required, in addition to the application of an objective standard, 
including probable and reasonable grounds.261 The Ministry concluded that the Bill 
maintained an appropriate balance between security intelligence needs and reasonable 
expectations of privacy, and appeared consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed by 
the Bill of Rights Act.262  
Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Act 2013 
In April 2013, Prime Minister and Minister responsible for the GCSB John Key announced a 
proposal for legislative changes to the GCSB Act 2003. These proposals were in response to a 
report completed in March 2013 by Rebecca Kitteridge entitled Review of Compliance at the 
Government Communications Security Bureau, which sought to assess GCSB’s operations and 
whether there were systems in place to ensure the lawfulness of those actions under 
relevant New Zealand and international law.263 In September 2012, GCSB Director Ian 
Fletcher and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) Chief Executive Andrew 
Kibblewhite had initiated the review after it was discovered that the GCSB had unlawfully 
intercepted the communications of New Zealand residents, including Mr Kim Dotcom (aka 
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Kim Schmitz).264 Dotcom was an Internet entrepreneur of German-Finnish origin whom, at 
the request of the New Zealand Police, the GCSB had monitored by intercepting his 
communications and monitoring his whereabouts in the weeks before a police raid on 
Dotcom’s house. Although not a New Zealand citizen, Dotcom had been granted New 
Zealand permanent residency, making GCSB’s surveillance illegal without the authority of an 
interception warrant.265 In late September 2012, Prime Minister Key publically apologised for 
the illegal spying, stating that every New Zealander was entitled to be protected by the law, 
and “we failed to provide that appropriate protection to them."266  
The activity of the GCSB in relation to Dotcom resulted in significant public criticism and 
reignited the debate within New Zealand of the appropriate balance between privacy and 
security. Much of this criticism centred on the agency’s unauthorised surveillance of Dotcom 
and his family.267 The case raised questions as to how such unlawful activity had been able to 
occur, and whether GCSB had undertaken any other unlawful surveillance in the past. That 
situation was the catalyst for the Review of Compliance.268  
The Compliance Review looked at whether the GCSB’s activities were undertaken within its 
powers and with appropriate safeguards in place. It concluded that from 1 April 2003, the 
GCSB had provided assistance to the NZSIS and, more rarely, the New Zealand Police, to 
monitor the communications of 88 New Zealanders without the authority of a warrant.269 
This activity fell outside the legal functions of the agency as the GCSB could only monitor 
foreign citizens or agents of foreign powers unless acting under the legal authority of 
another government agency. Without this authority the GCSB’s activity had been non-
compliant with governing legislation. The review also considered GCSB’s compliance model, 
including the agency’s ability to assess and identify legal compliance obligations, and prevent 
non-compliant behaviour.270 The Review concluded that the non-compliant activities of the 
                                                             
264 Ibid, p 125 
265 This assessment is based on the author’s interpretation of legislation governing the GCSB 
266 Adam Bennett and Claire Trevett, “PM says sorry to Dotcom.” (Otago Daily Times, September 27, 2012). 
Accessed January 12, 2014. www.odt.co.nz/news/national/227768/pm-says-sorry-
dotcom.www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10836884 
267 Kitteridge, p 81 
268 Ibid 
269 This was the date that the Government Communications Security Bureau Act 2003 was passed and the GCSB 
activity commenced being governed by legislation. 
270 Kitteridge, p 6 
 56 
 
GCSB were “symptomatic of underlying problems within GCSB, concerning GCSB’s structure, 
management of its information, capability and capacity.”271  
The report identified two broad problems with the legislation governing the GCSB. Firstly, 
while the GCSB Act provided for and authorised the GCSB’s current activities, it was not easy 
to determine whether any given activity fell within the scope of the prescribed functions of 
the GCSB or not.272 Secondly, since the enactment of the GCSB Act in 2003, there had been a 
number of changes in the threat environment facing New Zealand, particularly in the area of 
cyber-security, and developments in the law relating to privacy and search and surveillance, 
which required the GCSB Act to be updated.273  
The Review made a number of recommendations, including that the legislation governing 
the GCSB be reviewed “to clarify the application of the GCSB Act 2003 to the work of the 
GCSB.”274 The Review recommended amending the existing GCSB Act 2003 to address the 
issues that had been identified, as opposed to repealing and redrafting the Act altogether.275  
The DPMC supported amending the existing GCSB Act (as opposed to repealing it entirely), as 
this would enable greater clarity of the law governing the operation and administration of 
the GCSB; update GSCB’s functions to meet new threats, in particular cyber-security; and 
enable the GCSB to assist and advise other government agencies to fulfil their lawful 
functions with its technical capabilities and expertise.276 
The subsequent Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation 
Amendment Bill attracted significant public criticism but was vigorously defended by the 
Government:277 “Despite ill-informed claims to the contrary, nothing in this legislation allows 
for wholesale spying on New Zealanders. It actually tightens, not widens, the existing 
regime,'' Prime Minister Key stated. "It clarifies the GCSB's legal framework and substantially 
increases oversight of the country's intelligence agencies, which will go some way to 
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rebuilding public confidence in the GCSB.''278 The Act clarified the three functions of the 
GCSB, being Information assurance and cyber security; Foreign Intelligence; and assisting 
other agencies.  
Attorney-General Chris Finlayson explained during the second reading of the Bill:  
“This Bill is not revolutionary. It is not an aggressive expansion of State 
powers. Its purpose is to provide concrete rules that leave less room for 
uncertainty.”279  
The controversy over the amendments largely focused on the removal of Section 3.14 of the 
GCSB Act 2003, which stated: 
Interceptions not to target New Zealand citizens or permanent residents for 
intelligence-gathering purposes (1) In performing the Bureau’s function in 
section 8B, the Director, any employee of the Bureau, and any person acting 
on behalf of the Bureau must not authorise or do anything for the purpose of 
intercepting the private communications of a person who is a New Zealand 
citizen or a permanent resident of New Zealand, unless (and to the extent 
that) the person comes within the definition of foreign person or foreign 
organisation.280 
The Compliance Review identified that most of the difficulties associated with GCSB 
performing its functions were connected with section 3.14, specifically questions about the 
application of section 14 to the information assurance function of GCSB: “If, for example, a 
government agency requested GCSB to analyse the agency’s network in a case of a 
suspected malware attack, could GCSB help? If not, how could GCSB carry out this aspect of 
its important protective function?”281 The Review stated that it was under this section that 
surveillance of Dotcom had been illegal, and the legality of the 88 other New Zealand citizens 
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and permanent residents had been in dispute.282 Removing section 3.14 would allow the 
agency to fulfil its obligations under section 8 of the GCSB Act 2003, namely assisting the 
Police, the New Zealand Defence Force, and the NZSIS to perform their lawful functions.283  
Overall, the amendments achieved three overarching changes to the existing GCSB Act. The 
information assurance and cyber-security function were given greater prominence, and 
confirmed the GCSB’s responsibility to use its cyber-security capabilities to assist a range of 
public entities as well as private sector organisations such as critical national infrastructure 
providers and organisations of national significance. Secondly, the amendments provided 
transparency about the nature and scope of the agency’s foreign intelligence function , 
expressly describing the range of activities involved or the skills required in pursuit of this 
function.284 And thirdly, the amendment provided a clear legal authority for GCSB to offer 
expert advice and assistance to the New Zealand Defence Force, Police, and NZSIS in 
performing their lawful functions. It did so while ensuring the GCSB was confined to only 
conducting activities that the other entities were lawfully able to undertake, while being 
subject to limitations and restrictions that applied to the other entities.285  
While these amendments provided significant powers for the GCSB to assist domestic 
agencies, other amendments in the Bill provided greater oversight of the activities of New 
Zealand’s intelligence agencies. The Intelligence and Security Committee Amendment Act 
and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) Amendment Act were included in 
the omnibus Bill.286 In addition to updating the statutory framework of the GCSB through the 
previously discussed amendments, the ISC and IGIS Amendment Acts sought to “enhance the 
external oversight mechanisms that applied to the intelligence agencies by strengthening the 
office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and by improving the operation 
of Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee.”287 Sections 15A to 15F of the IGIS 
Amendment Act provided for an advisory panel and advice to the Inspector-General.288 The 
panel could also report direct to the Prime Minister. Section 15C provided that the panel 
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consisted of the Inspector-General plus two others appointed by the Prime Minister, one of 
whom must be a lawyer.289 The Inspector-General was also to be notified when a warrant 
was issued, amounting to increased independent oversight of the intelligence agencies. 
The omnibus Bill put in place a robust review of New Zealand’s intelligence agencies, 
beginning in 2015 and reoccurring every five to seven years thereafter. This review would 
appraise:  
“The effectiveness and appropriateness of the procedures adopted by each 
intelligence and security agency to ensure compliance with its governing 
legislation in relation to the issue and execution of warrants and 
authorisations; and 
The effectiveness and appropriateness of compliance systems concerning 
operational activity, including all supporting policies and practices of an 
intelligence and security agency relating to – (A) administration; (B) 
information management; (C) risk management; (D) legal compliance 
generally: to conduct unscheduled audits of the procedures and compliance 
systems”290 
This review was supported by civil liberties campaigners as it would support a wider public 
debate on the intelligence agencies, although it was noted that such a review would ideally 
have occurred before, not after, the legislation that provoked it had been enacted.291 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 
The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 replaced the now 
out-dated Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004. This Act extended the 
Government's powers in relation to the interception of telecommunications by New 
Zealand's law enforcement and intelligence and security agencies by compelling 
communications providers to provide lawful intercept capabilities so that the Police, NZSIS 
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and GCSB could access communications once they had an interception warrant. The Act also 
ensured that intelligence agencies were able to identify and intercept telecommunications 
on that network without intercepting material that was not covered by warrant. Thirdly, the 
Act required network operators to inform the GCSB of any proposed decision, course of 
action or change that raised a “network security risk” relating to New Zealand's national 
security. 
The Act was highly contentious and prompted significant response from privacy, human 
rights and Internet freedom advocates who complained of intrusive state powers and a lack 
of adequate oversight. The Government argued that the oversight mechanisms provided by 
the IGIS and ISC Acts were appropriate checks on the intelligence agencies activities. It is also 
notable that the intelligence agencies would not collect the information themselves, and 
would only gain access once the network operators had been presented with an interception 
warrant. 
18. Finding a Balance between Privacy and Security 
New Zealand’s privacy and security legislation has significantly changed in the past decade as 
New Zealand attempts to address the changing threats presented by globalisation and 
cyberspace. Similar changes have been mirrored by other states, creating a politically-
charged international debate regarding the appropriate balance between privacy and 
security. The UN Special Rapporteur of the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression noted a deep concern regarding actions taken by states against 
individuals communicating via the Internet, frequently justified broadly as being necessary to 
protect national security or to combat terrorism. The report noted the introduction of laws 
or amendments to existing laws to increase their power to monitor Internet users’ activities 
and content of communication without providing sufficient guarantees against abuse: 
The Special Rapporteur notes that the right to privacy can be subject to 
restrictions or limitations under certain exceptional circumstances. This may 
include State surveillance measures for the purposes of administration of 
criminal justice, prevention of crime or combating terrorism. However, such 
interference is permissible only if the criteria for permissible limitations under 
international human rights law are met. Hence, there must be a law that 
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clearly outlines the conditions whereby individuals’ right to privacy can be 
restricted under exceptional circumstances, and measures encroaching upon 
this right must be taken on the basis of a specific decision by a State 
authority expressly empowered by law to do so, usually the judiciary, for the 
purpose of protecting the rights of others, for example to secure evidence to 
prevent the commission of a crime, and must respect the principle of 
proportionality.292 
While the legislation introduced in New Zealand has certainly increased the ability of New 
Zealand’s intelligence agencies to access a wider range of data, this does not mean that all 
data is open and freely available. Instead, the legislation has increased transparency through 
public reviews of the intelligence agencies, and requires the agencies to annually declare 
their activities with regards to warrants and assistance provided. The legislation also gives 
the intelligence agencies a set of guiding principles that acknowledge the importance of 
human rights and the respect for individual privacy, and puts in place strong oversight 
mechanisms that ensure the agencies act appropriately. In addition, the New Zealand 
Government has emphasised that only metadata may be collected without the basis of a 
warrant. Any further information, such as the content of communications, can only be 
collected subject to an interception warrant. In a global era of increased threat from cyber-
attack, these measures allow New Zealand’s intelligence agencies to identify and deter 
threats to New Zealand, while respecting the civil liberties and privacy of individual citizens.  
Highlighting the inability of a small state such as New Zealand to conduct mass-surveillance 
programs, Prime Minister Key stated that “if the GCSB were to listen to every voice 
communication and read every text message that originated or terminated in New Zealand, 
it would take 130,000 people and cost NZ$6.6 billion.”293 Key made it clear that this was well 
outside New Zealand’s capability to resource. Instead, the key focus for New Zealand would 
remain the collection of intelligence appropriate to the defence of New Zealand and its 
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citizens, while maintaining the privacy and security of information. This was reinforced by 
New Zealand MP Maurice Williamson: 
“While there is a balance to be struck, there is a good deal of 
complementarity between the two sets of values, particularly in a strong 
democratic state such as New Zealand. Search powers that encroach too far 
on human rights values are unlikely to gain legislative or community support. 
Similarly, investigative powers that are too tightly controlled and that 
prevent law enforcement officers from doing their job effectively will bring 
human rights norms into disrepute.”294  
New Zealand has also strengthened the oversight and accountability of its intelligence 
services. The Intelligence and Security Committee, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, and the Ministry of Justice each act as a 
check and balance on widespread collection of data New Zealanders. If such collection were 
to occur, it would first be necessary to justify the collection through the application for 
judicial warrants. Subsequent reviews would ensure the collection was appropriate and 
within legal boundaries. 
19. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify and examine the threats that an increasingly 
connected world presents to modern states. The rise of cyberspace and new 
communications technologies provides significant benefits, allowing individual citizens, 
private corporations and governments to interact and communicate easily and efficiently. At 
the same time, these advances have brought new vulnerabilities to the security of states and 
individuals. The scale and sophistication of cyber-attacks has risen dramatically in just the 
last few years and there is no single solution to address these threats. The core attributes of 
cyberspace that are central to the success of globalisation in the 21st century, including low 
cost of entry, anonymity and a global reach, also present significant challenges to traditional 
state security defence strategies. The diversified nature of the Internet now allows 
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aggressors to conduct cyber-attacks across borders and attack state and non-state actors 
alike. As a result, the social contract between state and citizen is extended to cyberspace, 
and the collection of intelligence enables states to protect its citizens by deterring attacks by 
aggressors. We have also seen that liberal democratic states face greater challenges to 
addressing cyber-security challenges than authoritarian states, which are more willing to 
restrict or limit Internet access. The complexity and scale of cyber-threats that mean no 
individual state has sufficient resources to ensure complete security. To address this, states 
may pursue alliance building, institutionalism, and identity and norm creation strategies. A 
central challenge to these approaches is the lack of global government and international law 
governing cyberspace.   
Globalisation has enlarged the security interests of New Zealand so that it can no longer rely 
on its isolation as the only defence against attack. As a small state, New Zealand lacks the 
resources to address these threats autonomously and has pursued a number of security 
strategies to compensate for this. Membership of security alliances and international 
institutions has enabled New Zealand to provide protection for its citizens beyond that which 
the state could provide alone. This includes strengthening intelligence sharing with the Five 
Eyes security alliance and developing closer bilateral ties with the US as it pivots its security 
interest toward Asia-Pacific. Beyond this, New Zealand has enhanced its domestic cyber 
capabilities to compensate for where international norms and law are insufficient. These 
domestic capabilities provide greater protection for New Zealand’s interests, corporations 
and citizens by deterring potential aggressors from attacking through strong signalling of the 
capabilities and intentions of the state and intelligence agencies.  
The legislative changes enacted by the New Zealand Government have built upon already 
existing laws that seek to address the technological changes that the Internet and an 
increasingly globalised world bring. The creation of the National Cyber Security Centre has 
demonstrated the New Zealand Government’s willingness to address the cyber-threats by 
raising awareness amongst state agencies, private corporations and private citizens.  Security 
focused legislation has been enacted that seeks to deter attacks from occurring, and 
provides greater capability by New Zealand’s intelligence agencies to identify and prosecute 
perpetrators if necessary. This legislation has also removed any ambiguity regarding the 
lawful responsibilities of New Zealand’s intelligence agencies.  
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As a result of these legislative changes and revelations of secret mass surveillance 
programmes operated by some of its security partners, New Zealand has experienced a 
significant debate on the power of the state to monitor cyber communications and the 
appropriate balance between privacy and security. While this debate is likely to continue 
into the future, the significant oversights that act as a check and balance over the activities 
of the NZSIS and GCSB provide reassurance that the New Zealand Government is mindful of 
the delicate steps it must take to address the rapidly evolving security environment. The 
2015 review of New Zealand’s security agencies will likely prove enlightening for security and 
civil liberties advocates alike by providing an accurate assessment of New Zealand’s privacy 
and security balance. The challenge for New Zealand will be maintaining this balance into the 
future as the world becomes increasingly connected online and the deterrence of cyber 
threats becomes central to New Zealand’s core national security imperatives. 
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